Federal Reserve examiners, state
member banks, bank holding companies, and U.S. branches and agencies
of foreign banks should be aware of recent targeted examinations and
investigations by the Federal Reserve and the Enforcement Division
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as court actions,
that have found banks in violation of Regulation U (12 CFR 221) (Credit
by Banks for the Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stock) in
connection with extensions of credit by bank trust departments, using
bank or other fiduciary funds, to individuals involved in illegal
“day trading” or “free-riding” schemes. These activities also involved
the aiding and abetting of violations of two other securities credit
regulations: Regulation T (12 CFR 220) (Credit by Brokers and Dealers)
and Regulation X (12 CFR 224) (Borrowers of Securities Credit). Day
trading and free-riding schemes involve the purchase and sale of stock
on the same day (or within a very short period of time) and the funding
of the purchases by the sales’ proceeds.
Because of the illegal activities described below, banking
organizations have been exposed to disciplinary proceedings, as well
as to substantial credit risk. To date, several banks have sustained
monetary losses in their trust departments as a result of their involvement
in these schemes.
In the late 1980s, the SEC started to uncover illegal
free-riding schemes and addressed them through injunctive actions
filed against broker-dealers and banks in federal district court.
In one case, SEC v. Hansen, et al., 726 F. Supp. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), a bank was found to have violated Regulation U by
knowingly participating in a free-riding scheme. This was the first
case in which the SEC sued a bank for illegal securities clearance
activities associated with a free-riding scheme. It appears that over
the past several months these illegal schemes have resurfaced. Investigations
and examinations by SEC and Federal Reserve staffs have detected similar
violations by state member and national banks’ trust departments,
leading to follow-up enforcement actions. Thus, increased vigilance
by Federal Reserve examiners and banking organizations is called for
to ensure that state member banks’ trust departments, as well as bank
holding companies’ nonbank subsidiaries and U.S. branches and agencies
of foreign banks that conduct trust-related activities, take all steps
necessary to prevent their customers from involving them in the customers’
attempts at free-riding. Prompt enforcement action may be necessary
to accomplish this in some situations.
Summary of Illegal Activities The free-riding conduct in question typically involves
individuals trading large amounts of securities without depositing
the necessary money or appropriate collateral in their customer accounts.
The customer seeks to free-ride—that is, purchase and sell the same
securities and pay for the purchase with the proceeds of the sale.
Often, free-riding schemes involve initial public offerings because
broker-dealers are prohibited from financing these new issues. If
the money to pay for the securities is not in the account when the
securities are delivered in a delivery-versus-payment or receive-versus-payment
(DVP) transaction, a bank or other financial institution that permits
completion of the transaction creates a temporary overdraft in the
customer’s account. This overdraft is an extension of credit that
is subject to Regulation U.
The typical device used by the perpetrators of a free-riding
scheme is for a new customer to open a custodial agency account into
which a number of broker-dealers will deliver securities or funds
on a DVP basis. Although a deposit may be made into the custodial
agency account, the amount of trading is greatly in excess of the
original deposit, causing the bank to extend its own credit to meet
the payment and delivery obligations of the account. Thus, while the
financial institution may be generating fees based on the activity
of these accounts, it is subjecting itself to substantial losses should
the market prices for the purchased securities fall or failed transactions
otherwise occur. In addition, other liabilities under federal banking
and securities laws may be involved.
Application of Securities Credit Regulations Regulation U. Because there is
no exemption in Regulation U for trust activities in a bank or other
financial institution,
1 any extension of credit in the course of settling
customer securities transactions must comply with all of the provisions
of Regulation U.
2 This
includes the requirement that all extensions of credit that are secured
by marginable stock be within the 50 percent margin limit set by Regulation
U.
To avoid violations of the Board’s securities credit regulations,
the customer’s account must hold sufficient funds on settlement date
to pay for each transaction and the funds may not include the proceeds
of their sale. If a financial institution is relying on the proceeds
of the sale of securities as its source of payment for accepting delivery
of the securities, Board staff, the SEC, and the courts have viewed
the institution as extending credit secured by the securities to the
customer. Because Regulation U limits the amount of credit that can
be extended in these cases to 50 percent of the securities’ current
market value if the securities qualify as margin stock and, generally,
in a free-riding scheme a customer’s account does not have funds to
pay for all such purchases or a customer instructs the institution
to pay for the purchase of securities with the proceeds from those
securities’ sale, a banking organization that has extended credit
in a free-riding scheme has violated Regulation U.
Although the proscriptions of Regulation U
apply only to transactions in margin stock, free-riding in nonmargin
stocks in custodial agency accounts could, as described below, result
in aiding and abetting violations by the banking organization of Regulations
T and X, and other securities laws, and raise financial safety-and-soundness
issues.
Regulations T
and X. Because the custodial agency accounts described above
are used to settle transactions effected by the customer at broker-dealers,
a banking organization that opens this type of account should have
some general understanding of how Regulation T restricts the customer’s
use of the account at the institution. Regulation T requires the use
of a cash account for customer purchases or sales on a DVP basis.
Section 220.8(a) of Regulation T specifies that cash-account transactions
are predicated on the customer’s agreement that he or she will make
full cash payment for securities before selling them and does not
intend to sell them before making such payment. Therefore, free-riding
is prohibited in a cash account. A customer who instructs his or her
agent bank or other financial institution to pay for a security in
reliance on the proceeds of its sale in a DVP transaction is causing,
or aiding or abetting, the broker-dealer to violate the credit restrictions
of Regulation T. Regulation X, which generally prohibits borrowers
from willfully causing credit to be extended in contravention of Regulations
T or U, also applies to the customer in such cases.
As described above, banking organizations involved
in free-riding schemes may be aiding and abetting violations of Regulation
T by the broker-dealers delivering securities or funds to the institutions’
customers’ accounts. As long as the bank or other financial institution
uses its funds to complete a customers’s transactions, the broker-dealers
may not discover that they are selling securities to the customer
in violation of their obligations under Regulation T. A similar aiding
and abetting violation of Regulation X could occur with respect to
violations by the customers who have used the financial institution
to induce their broker-dealers to violate Regulation T.
New-Customer Inquiries and Warning Signals Trust examiners, as well as commercial
examiners, should make sure that all banking organizations follow
appropriate written policies and procedures concerning the establishment
of custodial agency accounts or any new account involving customer
securities transactions. They should address, among other things,
ways an institution can protect against free-riding schemes. One of
the ways financial institutions can protect themselves is to obtain
adequate background and credit information from new clients, including
whether the customer intends to obtain bank credit to use the account
for transactions as if it were a margin account at a broker-dealer.
This type of activity requires more extensive monitoring than the
typical DVP account in which no credit is extended. It would be prudent
to inquire why a new customer is not utilizing the margin account
services of its broker-dealers. Regulation U Form FR U-1 must be obtained
and constantly updated if the account is to be used as a margin account.
It also would be advisable for the financial institution
to obtain from the customer a list of broker-dealers that will be
sending securities to or receiving funds from the account on a DVP
basis. If it appears that a number of broker-dealers may be used on
a DVP basis, the banking organization should obtain an undertaking
from the customer, as part of the new account agreement, that all
transactions with the broker-dealer will be in conformance with Regulations
T and X and that the customer is aware that a cash account security
is not to be sold until it is paid for. Similarly, in obtaining instructions
for settling DVP transactions for a customer, the institution should
clarify that it will not pay for the purchase of securities with the
proceeds from the sale of those securities.
Examiners, state member banks, bank holding companies,
and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks exercising trust powers
should also ensure that banking organizations monitor such accounts
closely for an initial period to detect patterns typical of free-riding,
including intraday overdrafts, and ensure that sufficient funds or
margin collateral are on deposit at all times. Frequent transactions
in securities being offered in an initial public offering may suggest
an avoidance of Regulations T and X. In the event it appears that
a customer is attempting to free-ride, an institution immediately
should alert the broker-dealers involved and take steps to minimize
its own credit risk and legal liability.
At a minimum, examiners should also
evaluate
a trust institution’s ability to ensure that it does not extend more
credit on behalf of the banking organization to a customer than is
permitted under Regulation U. Any overdraft related to a purchase
or sale of margin stock is an extension of credit subject to the regulation,
including overdrafts that are outstanding for less than a day. Board
staff has published a number of opinions discussing the application
of Regulation U to various transactions relating to free-riding in
the
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service. See, for example,
5-942.2,
5-942.18, and
5-942.15.
SEC and Federal Reserve
Sanctions and Enforcement Actions As
noted earlier, the SEC has exercised its broad authority to enforce
the Board’s securities credit regulations. This has included the initiation
of several enforcement actions in federal district court against banks
involved in activities similar to those outlined above, as well as
the preparation of other cases that are pending. In each completed
case, the SEC obtained permanent injunctions against future violations
from the banks involved. The SEC also required the banks to establish
credit compliance committees to formulate written policies and procedures
concerning the extension of purpose credit in their securities clearance
business, establish training programs for bank personnel responsible
for the conduct of their securities-clearance business, and submit
to outside audits to ascertain whether the banks met their undertakings
under the injunctions.
It should be noted that under recently revised section
21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC may, and has stated
an intention to, seek civil money penalties in addition to federal
district court injunctive actions. Civil penalties and aiding and
abetting liability may be assessed by the SEC against a banking organization
if the customer or its broker-dealer is found in violation of Regulations
X or T, and if the financial institution has knowledge of the facts
and assists the scheme—that is, by extending credit to finance the
free-riding.
In addition, the Board may institute enforcement proceedings
against the banking organizations supervised by the Federal Reserve
and their institution-affiliated parties involved in these activities,
including cease and desist, civil money penalty assessment, and removal
and permanent prohibition actions. SR-93-13; March 16, 1993.
The above is the full text of this policy letter, issued
by the Board’s Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation to the
Federal Reserve Banks.