This policy sets forth a framework
for applying risk-focused supervision concepts to small shell bank
holding companies (SSBHCs).
1 It was developed in the interest of increasing the effectiveness
of Federal Reserve supervisory activities, while enhancing interagency
coordination and reducing regulatory burden on banking organizations.
In recent years, changes to statutory frequency requirements for bank
examinations, enhancements to off-site monitoring procedures, and
the implementation of risk-focused examination practices have made
it possible to focus supervisory activities more effectively on SSBHCs
exhibiting the greatest degree of risk. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve
is adopting a risk-focused supervision program for SSBHCs that tailors
supervisory activities for these companies based on an assessment
of their reported condition and activities and the condition of their
bank subsidiaries. Based on these assessments, Reserve Banks will
be required to develop a strategy for addressing the supervisory issues
related to each organization. For companies where significant risk
factors are present, Reserve Banks must consider a range of supervisory
responses, including informational requests and management interviews,
visitations or advisory visits, as well as on-site target and full-scope
inspection activities. The program is to be implemented as soon as
practical, but should be fully operational by November 30, 1997. With
the implementation of this program, the Board is rescinding for SSBHCs
the bank holding company inspection scope and frequency requirements
of S-2493, “Examination Frequency and Communicating with Directors”
(at
3-1531).
Risk-Assessment
Process Under this program, Reserve
Banks should perform a risk assessment for each SSBHC at least once
during each “supervisory cycle.” For each company, its supervisory
cycle will be determined by the examination frequency mandated for
the lead subsidiary bank. The purpose of this risk assessment is to
determine whether the risk profile of the SSBHC has weakened, the
company is having an adverse effect on the subsidiary bank(s), or
there are violations of law or regulation warranting further review.
As described more fully below, where the risk assessment does not
raise significant supervisory concerns, the assessment would serve
as the basis for assigning a final BOPEC rating for the company. The
risk assessment should be completed within 45 days of receipt of the
lead bank’s full-scope examination report. While risk assessments
will be driven in most cases by the conclusions expressed in the current
examination reports for subsidiary banks, they should also incorporate information
from other sources available at the Reserve Bank, such as regulatory
financial reports, previous inspection reports, and surveillance reports.
The preparation of risk assessments should not routinely require requests
for additional information from the company. Risk assessments should
include reviews of the following areas:
- financial condition of the parent company, including
an evaluation of debt levels and cash flow
- financial condition of bank subsidiaries
- consolidated analysis (if applicable)
- management, including any changes to senior management
or ownership
- compliance with laws and regulations by the bank holding
company and bank subsidiaries, as well as compliance with regulatory
orders and other requirements imposed in connection with the granting
of any application or other request
- intercompany and insider transactions as addressed
by examinations and financial reports
- new activities and recent or planned acquisitions
In the process of conducting the risk assessment Reserve
Banks should pay special attention to bank examination report findings
pertaining to possible violations of law or inappropriate transactions.
In addition, changes in the organizational structure, management,
or ownership of the company should be assessed to determine whether
these may be cause for concern. The use of automated analytical tools
and screens to perform the required financial analysis will normally
suffice. When this review discloses no material supervisory concerns,
the risk assessment should be used to assign a final rating to the
company.
Development of Supervisory
Strategies If no unusual supervisory
issues or concerns are identified by the risk assessment, no special
follow-up with the company is necessary. However, all companies should
continue to be monitored under existing surveillance and monitoring
programs aimed at identifying significant changes in a company’s condition,
performance, or compliance profile that may prompt further review.
Such changes may include (1) a material decline in the earnings performance
or capital position of a bank subsidiary; (2) significant changes
in management or ownership; (3) a large increase in outstanding debt;
(4) new or expanded activities that may pose additional risk; (5)
rapid growth; (6) questionable insider or intercompany transactions;
(7) less than satisfactory SEER or other performance factors for the
subsidiary bank(s); or (8) information suggesting less-than-satisfactory
compliance with regulatory orders and other requirements imposed in
connection with the granting of any application or other request.
When these or other changes raise supervisory concerns, the risk assessment
should be updated using the methods discussed below.
When a risk assessment is prepared in conjunction
with the review of an examination report for a bank rated satisfactory
or better, but supervisory concerns such as those listed above preclude
the immediate assignment of a satisfactory BOPEC rating, a strategy
for addressing those concerns must be developed and documented as
part of the risk assessment. The strategy would typically require
gathering additional information from the bank regulator or the company,
either written or verbal. Where supervisory concerns are not satisfactorily
addressed through off-site measures, a number of remedies should be
considered, including visitations, targeted reviews of internal processes
and specific transactions, or broader inspections encompassing a review
of more significant financial and managerial issues, processes, or
reporting systems. The specific timing of these activities is not
prescribed by this policy; however, the on-site activity should be
conducted as soon as possible following the off-site review, given
that it is required only in situations when supervisory concerns have
surfaced.
Strategies for Problem
and Deteriorating Companies and Those with Identified Management Weaknesses A full-scope on-site inspection should
be conducted the first time that the risk-assessment preliminarily
supports the assignment of a BOPEC rating of 3 or worse, or a management
rating of less than satisfactory. Typically, this would occur when
a significant subsidiary bank’s CAMELS composite or management component
is assigned a rating of 3, 4, or 5. In such a case, an inspection
is deemed necessary to ensure that sufficient information is available
to develop an effective supervisory strategy. The purpose of the inspection
is (1) to confirm the Reserve Bank’s understanding of the SSBHC’s
financial condition, activities, and management oversight of the bank,
as well as whether violations of law or regulation or inappropriate
intercompany transactions have occurred; (2) to determine the extent
to which any of these factors is having an adverse effect on the bank(s);
(3) to identify steps the holding company should take to strengthen
its subsidiary bank(s); and (4) to assign a BOPEC rating to the company.
Based on these inspection results and information available prior
to the inspection, and in consultation with the bank’s federal and
state supervisory authority(ies), the Reserve Bank should develop
a supervisory strategy for dealing with the company.
In situations where the company and management
are adversely affecting the bank, the strategy should contemplate
enforcement activities that are coordinated with those of the bank’s
federal or state regulator(s), a clear delineation of the actions
and reports expected of holding company management, and plans for
additional supervisory activities, either on-site or off-site. The
Reserve Bank should designate a primary contact responsible for monitoring
the company’s condition and updating the risk assessment and supervisory
strategy.
In situations where the bank holding company is neither
contributing to the bank’s problems nor in a position to serve as
a source of strength, a typical supervisory strategy would be to maintain
an open dialogue with the bank’s primary regulator(s) and to review
relevant regulatory reports.
Communicating Supervisory Findings When a risk assessment discloses no supervisory concerns, or when
an existing 3, 4, or 5 BOPEC rating is reaffirmed through the risk
assessment, a brief letter detailing this overall conclusion and the
SSBHC’s BOPEC rating should be forwarded to the company. A prototype
of such a letter is attached.
When more detailed off-site reviews are performed or on-site
targets or visitations are conducted, Reserve Banks may also communicate
the scope of these activities, relevant findings, and supervisory
recommendations to the company in a letter. Alternatively, the findings
can be conveyed to the company in a more structured report similar
to the existing bank holding company inspection report. When full-scope
inspections are conducted, use of existing bank holding company report
pages is mandatory; however, the only pages required to be completed
are the examiner’s comments, scope, analysis of financial factors,
and the confidential pages. The use of any other page (including financial
data pages) should be limited to situations where its presentation
is useful for supporting conclusions or recommendations.
With regard to correspondence and
reports to satisfactorily rated SSBHCs, it is generally appropriate
for commissioned, non-officer personnel who are designated as the
primary contact or portfolio manager for such companies to have signing
authority. Reports and other official communications to problem and
deteriorating companies require an officer’s signature.
Discontinuation of Risk-Management Ratings
for SSBHCs Effective January 1, 1997,
the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (CAMELS) was amended
specifically to require the evaluation of risk-management systems
both in the overall management rating and in the individual financial
components. By definition, financial and management activities at
SSBHCs are conducted in the subsidiary banks and the risk-management
process of the company is essentially the same as that of the bank(s).
Accordingly, no separate risk-management rating will be required of
SSBHCs.
Newly Formed SSBHCs Consistent with long-standing Federal
Reserve policy, an initial full-scope, on-site inspection of a newly
formed SSBHC should be conducted within the first 12 to 18 months
of operations. Thereafter, risk assessments should be performed in
accordance with this policy. S-2587, attachment A; Nov. 3, 1997.