Issued December 15,
2023
The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) (collectively, the “federal banking agencies”)
are issuing this statement to extend the
Extension of the Revised
Statement Regarding Status of Certain Investment Funds and Their Portfolio
Investments for Purposes of Regulation O and Reporting Requirements
under Part 363 of FDIC Regulations, which they issued on December
22, 2022, and is set to expire on January 1, 2024.
1 This statement
extends the expiration of the no-action position previously provided.
Pursuant to section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act,
2 extensions of credit by banks
3 to executive
officers, directors, and principal shareholders (and related interests
of such persons) (collectively, “insiders”)
4 must comply with
certain individual and aggregate lending limits, and large extensions
of credit by banks to insiders must be approved in advance by a majority
of their boards of directors in a vote in which interested directors
may not participate.
5
Certain banking firms have raised
concerns about the application of Regulation O to companies that sponsor,
manage, or advise investment funds and institutional accounts that
invest in voting securities of banking firms (such investment vehicles,
collectively “funds,” and, together with the company that
sponsors, manages, or advises them, “fund complexes”).
6 Over the past few years, fund complexes
have acquired, or have approached acquiring, more than 10 percent
of a class of voting securities of a wide range of public companies,
including banks and nonbank companies. Upon acquiring more than 10
percent of a class of voting securities of a banking firm, a fund
complex would be a “principal shareholder” of the bank
for purposes of Regulation O (a “principal shareholder fund
complex”). Likewise, under Regulation O, any company in which
a principal shareholder fund complex owns more than 10 percent of
a class of voting securities could, in some instances, be presumed
to be a “related interest” of the fund complex (“fund
complex-controlled portfolio company”). In that event, the principal
shareholder fund complex and its controlled portfolio companies would
be considered insiders of the bank under Regulation O. Accordingly,
the bank’s lending to the principal shareholder fund complex
and its fund-complex controlled portfolio companies would be subject
to the strict lending limits and other restrictions and standards
of Regulation O.
Banks have indicated that the treatment of fund complex-controlled
portfolio companies as “related interests” under Regulation
O could require the sudden and disruptive unwinding of substantial
pre-existing lending relationships and reduce credit availability
to a wide swath of financial and nonfinancial companies.
The Board, in consultation with
the OCC and the FDIC, continues to actively consider whether to amend
Regulation O to address the treatment of extensions of credit to fund complex-controlled
portfolio companies under Regulation O. In the interim, the federal
banking agencies believe it is appropriate to articulate supervisory
expectations with respect to the application of Regulation O in this
specific context in order to provide banks flexibility to lend to
certain fund complex-controlled portfolio companies, subject to the
following eligibility criteria:
(1) With regard to the fund complex:
a. The fund complex does not directly or indirectly control:
i. 15 percent
or more of any class of voting securities of the bank;
7 or
ii. 20 percent or more of any class of voting
securities of the bank if it has received applicable agency correspondence
referencing at least such a percentage,
8 if:
1. No individual fund in the fund complex
owns more than 10 percent of any class of voting securities of the
bank. For this purpose, two or more funds that share the same or substantially
the same investment objective and asset composition are treated as
an individual fund; and
2. Non-index funds in the fund complex do not collectively own more
than 10 percent of any class of voting securities of the bank.
9 b. The fund complex does not have or
seek to have any representative serve as an officer, agent, or employee
of the bank; and
c. The fund complex does not exercise or attempt to exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies of the bank, including attempting
to influence the dividend polices, loan, credit, or investment decisions
or policies, pricing of services, personnel decisions, operations
activities, or any other similar activities or decisions of the bank.
(2) With
regard to the bank, the bank does not knowingly make an extension
of credit to a fund complex-controlled portfolio company, unless the
terms of such extension of credit are on substantially the same terms
as those prevailing for comparable transactions with unaffiliated
third parties and do not involve more than normal risk of repayment
or present other unfavorable features.
The federal banking agencies would not take
action against banks or principal shareholder fund complexes with
respect to extensions of credit by the banks to fund complex-controlled
portfolio companies that otherwise would violate Regulation O, provided
the fund complexes and banks satisfy the foregoing criteria.
10 The no-action position provided herein covers
extensions of credit to fund complex-controlled portfolio companies
only, and does not extend to any extension of credit to principal
shareholder fund complexes.
11
This statement supersedes previous
statements issued by the federal banking agencies that established
a no-action position for banks and principal shareholder fund complexes concerning
extensions of credit by banks to fund complex-controlled portfolio
companies that otherwise would have violated Regulation O. Unless
amended, extended, or superseded in writing, this statement will cease
to be effective on the sooner of January 1, 2025, or the effective
date of a final Board rule having a revision to Regulation O that
addresses the treatment of extensions of credit by a bank to fund
complex-controlled portfolio companies that are insiders of the bank.
Principal shareholder fund complexes and banks that satisfy
the eligibility criteria of this statement and rely on it for purposes
of Regulation O continue to be subject to all other applicable laws
and regulations not addressed in this statement. This statement does
not insulate a principal shareholder fund complex or bank from actions
the federal banking agencies may take with respect to any other violations
of law or regulation or from safety and soundness criticisms related
to loans made or actions taken pursuant to this statement.
The federal banking agencies remind
fund complexes that federal securities laws require the public disclosure
of beneficial ownership stakes under various conditions. These disclosure
obligations may change based on several factors, including whether
the investing fund complex is acquiring the securities with the purpose
or effect of “changing or influencing the control of the issuer.”
12 Fund complexes should consult the rules and guidance of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to determine their disclosure
obligations given the facts and circumstances around whether an investor
or group would be viewed as acquiring or holding the securities with
the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of an
issuer under the SEC’s rules.
Interagency
statement of December 15, 2023 (SR-23-10).